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important to our welfare, cannot reasonably be criticised for honestly
expressing our opinion upon this subject.
I do not mean to question the attitude toward this investigation of
any of those who have any connection with the work, for, until I am
shown to the contrary by their work, I shall be pleased to believe that
their efforts will be prompted only by the highest motives born of an
honest desire to improve public conditions and free from any desire on
their part to needlessly annoy, much less harm our financial institutions,
which are the very bulwarks of our national strength.
The President: I am sure the members of the Section and
those who have heard this able address are under great obliga
tions to Mr. Reynolds, and I desire, in the name of all present,
to thank him for this excellent paper prepared for us.
The next address, "Some Unscheduled Liabilities," has been
prepared by the Dean of the University of Michigan, Henry M.
Bates, Esq. Mr. Bates, will you please come to the platform?
SOME UNSCHEDULED LIABILITIES OF TRUST
COMPANIES
By Dean Henry M. Bates, of the University of Michigan.
I wish, at the outset, to express my thanks for most helpful sugges
tions as to some of the legal problems arising in the performance of
the duties of trust companies, and for information concerning the cus
tom and practice regarding the matters with which I shall deal, to the
following gentlemen: Mr. F. H. Goff. of Cleveland; Mr. Ralph Stone,
of Detroit; Mr. Louis Boisot, Mr. H. A. Dow, and Mr. Horace S. Oakley,
of Chicago; Mr. Stanley D. McGraw, Mr. Henry C. Swords, and Mr.
E. C. Hebbard, of New York.
The modern trust company, with its varied and highly developed
functions, is a characteristic product of our present complex civiliza
tion. It meets the insistent economic demand for division of labor,
specialized service, expert skill, fidelity, and financial responsibility,
without which many of the most important and most characteristic
business undertakings of the present day could scarcely be carried on.
The multiplying and ever-refining needs of the business and industrial
world have thrown upon this modern conception the performance of a
vast number of diversified functions, but, nevertheless, so skilfully has
the organization been made responsive to the dominant economic move
ments of the day, that unification rather than segregation of functions
has resulted. The trust company, as some one has said, has become
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the corporation's corporation, a sort of super-corporation, as it were,
an expression which may convey some meaning in these days when our
literature is so full of the idea of the super-man, living a life and per
forming functions just above and beyond those of ordinary human beings.
This, I think, is not mere glittering generality. The trust company
cannot be classified with other corporations or business organizations,
either from the point of view of the law pertaining to its creation and
subsequent life, nor from that of its functions. This must be clear
when we consider that trust companies perform functions heretofore
distributed among banks, safe deposit companies, and individual or
corporate trustees, escrow holders, title guarantors, and agents and
fiduciaries of almost every conceivable kind.
The question then naturally arises, is there any law peculiar to trust
companies? Have court decisions, in conjunction with statutes, resulted
in a jurisprudence of trust companies? Or, to put a question not so
comprehensive, have the activities of these companies resulted in the
enunciation of any peculiar and characteristic doctrines of law? If
these questions are to receive a categorical answer, it must be "no."
Trust companies, being corporations, are governed, of course, by the
statutes of the State relating to corporations in general and to the
trust company in particular and to those developments of the judge-
made law pertaining to corporations. I have not been able to find a
single decision by any English or American court which can be said to
arise out of any peculiarity of the trust company per se. All of the
litigation of which I am aware has been settled by the application of
statutory law or by the doctrines of the common law relating to cor
porations, or more often to the particular function or activity involved
in each case. The manifold and tremendously important activities of
trust companies, then, have thus far only added to the development of
the law relating to corporations, principal and agent, and other old
branchea of the common law. In view of the magnitude of the opera
tions of these companies, their failure to produce a new branch of law
may seem somewhat surprising. It is due first to the comparative
novelty of this form of business organization, but largely, I think, to
a certain toughness of English and American law, if not of English
and American lawyers, which resists change and novelty of classifica
tion. Our common law and our common lawyers are prone, and rightly
so, to decide new cases according to old principles, and to find guidance
for the determination of rights growing out of new activities, in the
rules laid down for older and analogous organizations. If this paper
has any marked trend, it will be in the direction of inquiring whether
this condition of things is likely to continue in the future, or whether
we may not, in some respects at least, anticipate the enunciation of
principles of law based, of course, upon the old immutable principles
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of justice and equity, but arising out of new functions and new rela
tionships created by trust companies and peculiar thereto.
In undertaking to address you on this occasion my first plan was
to consider a number of the transactions in which trust companies arc
engaged, principally in its capacities ns transfer agent and registrar
of corporate stock, and as trustee under mortgages securing corporate
bonds. I have, to a large extent, abandoned this plan, however, first,
localise I find there has been very little development of the law since
other papers on this subject were read to you, and partly because the
admirable report of the Stock Transfer Conference of Transfer Agents
and Counsel has been recently published and it discusses the impor
tant questions with which a transfer agent and registrar is obliged to
deal, and contains a promise of fuller treatment with citations of
authorities in a book shortly to be published. For me, then, to go
over this ground would be superfluous, not to say presumptuous. I
shall confine myself therefore to a brief consideration of the liability
incurred by the trust company in its dealing with corporate stock
and bonds in order to show what little development the decisions of
the last few years have produced, and especially of seeking to find
out the general trend of that development, with a view to hazarding
some opinion as to its probable future course and direction.
Let us, then, first inquire to what extent the liability of trust com
panies, acting as transfer agents and registrars, has been established
by statutes or decisions of the courts. Statutes afford almost no
assistance in determining this liability, and court decisions on the sub
ject are extremely few in number. I bis is a splendid tribute to the
skill and fidelity with which trust companies have performed their
delicate, important duties, but it makes it difficult to state with con
fidence or precision the nature and extent of the liabilities incurred.
One is further embarrassed in the effort to make such a statement by
the fact that there is lack of uniformity, and especially an almost
complete lack of precision and definition, in the contracts of employ
ment of transfer agents and registrars and in the language used by
such agents in certifying the performance of their duties. Authority
for the employment of these agents is derived, of course, from reso
lutions of the directors of the corporations making such employment.
So far as I have had opportunity to examine such resolutions, while
they agreed in general purport, they differ considerably in detail;
and in defining the functions to be performed they are content, as a
rule, to use only general terms, such as "registrar," "transfer agent"
and the like. The method of procedure is sometimes stated, or at
least implied, and provision is made for the filing of sample signatures
of the corporate officers, and sometimes for the employment of counsel,
designated and paid by the principal corporation, to pass upon legal
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problems for the guidance and immunity of the trust company. No
attempt has been made in any of the resolutions I have seen to define
or limit the liability of the trust company either to its principal or
to buyers and sellers of the corporate stock. The question of ultimate
liability to third persons could not, of course, be determined by reso
lution or by contract between the principal and agent corporations.
In 1907 Mr. Ralph Stone, of Detroit, published a valuable paper on
this subject,* in which he showed that at that time the trust com
panies of New York used at least seven different words or phrases to
indicate the performance of their duties as registrar. "Registered,"
"entered," "countersigned" and "countersigned and registered" were
those most commonly used in New York and elsewhere. So far as I
have been able to learn, the same divergence in language still exists.
It has been said often in this Section that the relation between the
corporation and its transfer agent or registrar is that of principal
and agent. Certainly that relationship exists, and out of it grow cer
tain duties and liabilities, the general principles of which are fairly
well settled, but, as has been said, the application by courts of these
principles to specific cases have been very few in number.
As new cases arise, and as the funetions of the trust company, in
this and other respects, become more fully developed and highly spe
cialized, it is possible that new duties and liabilities will be recognized
by the courts. What the nature of these possible new liabilities may
be can be understood only by considering what those already estab
lished are. As the law stands to-day, the general outlines of the
relationship are fairly clear and simple. Any agent is liable to his
principal if he fails to exercise that degree of skill in the performance
of his duties which an ordinarily prudent and skillful man would
exercise in looking after his own affairs in like matters. Unquestion
ably, however, it has come to be recognized that the trust company is,
and holds itself out to be, especially skilled and expert in the per
formance of the duties in question. Compensation is doubtless based
upon this understanding. It follows, then, that the trust company
owes to its principal that high degree of care and skill which experts
in such matters ordinarily exercise. This, I admit, is a generality
which would be of little use to one not accustomed to applying gen
eral legal principles to specific cases. It certainly imports, however,
that the trust company, acting in these capacities, shall employ trained
and experienced clerks and officials who shall give to their work care
ful attention and shall have ample book and other office facilities for
the performance of their duties. It further imports that the trust
company's officials and employees shall understand and be governed
by the law pertaining to the transactions in question, and this often
* Trust Companies Magazine, 1007, page 214.
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involves the law of several States; that they shall take notice of all
matters or facts appearing in the transactions, or otherwise brought
to their notice in connection with such transactions, showing, or tend
ing to show, as the result of settled law or practice, any rightful
claims or liens or disabilities which destroy, restrict or limit the
right of the seller to sell or the buyer to buy the stock in question.
The transfer agent or registrar would, of course, be liable in case its
principal suffered damages by reason of the transfer or registration of
an excessive issue of stock.
The courts have made a somewhat subtle distinction in classifying
the liabilities of the agent with reference to third persons who, in
the transactions we are considering, would usually be the owners or
purchasers of stock. Even though the contract be exclusively between
the corporation and the trust company, the trust company is never
theless liable for all acts of misfeasance whereby third persons are
injured.* For nonfeasance, by which is meant nonperformance of its
duties, the agent, generally speaking, is not liable.t The courts of
New York have passed upon this very point as applied to transfers
of stock. The attention of your section has been called by others to
the case of Dunham against the City Traction Company, decided by
the Appellate Division, 101 N. Y. S., 87. In that case the transfer
agent was held not liable to a person entitled to a transfer of stock
for the agent's delay in making such transfer, the court holding that
there was no contract between the transfer agent and the stock pur
chaser, that the acts complained of amounted only to nonfeasance,
and that the purchaser's only recourse was against the corporation
itself. The clear inference from the opinion of the court is that the
corporation itself could have been made to respond in damages to the
plaintiff, though it was shown that the delay in making the transfer
was due to the honest but erroneous belief of the transfer agent that
as a matter of law the plaintiff was not entitled to receive a transfer
of stock without certain steps which had not been taken. (On this
point a recent Iowa case is instructive. Dooley vs. The Consolidated
Gold Mines Co., 109 N. W., 864.) Assuming, then, that the principal
was liable, did it have a remedy against its agent? The law is not
settled on this point, but in my opinion the tendency will be to hold
the agent liable to the principal on the ground that, as an expert in
the transfer of stock, his failure to know the law in connection there
with will not excuse him, but constitutes negligence. All this involves
a delay of results with which there is just impatience. This New York
case has since been confirmed by the Court of Appeals, 193 N. Y., 642.
There are at least five other decisions to the same effect by inferior
* Mechem on Agency, Sec. 571.
tMechem on Agency, Sec. 572; Ifuffcut on Agency, Sec. 212.
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courts in New York. I do not, however, believe that it would be safe
to assume that the courts of other States will always follow these
decisions. In the Dunham and other recent cases in New York the
decisions were made with very little discussion of the principles in
volved, but on the authority of much earlier New York cases, notably
that of Denny against the Manhattan Co., 2 Denio, 115. The trans
action involved in the transfer of stock in that case, and in all other
cases of that time, was very different from the present method. The
transfer was then made upon the books of the company, at its own
office, by a clerk or official of the company. The reason for insisting
that the injured party pursue his remedy only against the corpo
ration and not against its employee in such cases was clear. It may
be doubted if the same reason is fully applicable under modern con
ditions, but to this I wish to call more particular attention later.
In my opinion, trust companies should also take notice of the recent
tendency in many of our State courts to limit the scope of this doc
trine of nonfeasance. Thus, it has been held in many cases that where
the agent undertakes the performance of an act in which the rights
or property of a third person are involved, if he then abandons the
undertaking, or neglects to perform some part of it, or so delays his
performance that the person is injured, the case is really one of mis
feasance and not merely of nonfeasance. See, for example, Osborne
against Morgan, 130 Mass., 102. It is not clear to me that the New
York courts have been sufficiently impressed by this somewhat newer
doctrine. To refuse to transfer corporate stock to one entitled to it,
repeatedly has been held to constitute conversion for which the cor
poration is liable. Some court may some day hold that if the agent
takes the assigned old certificate preliminary to transfer, and then
refuses to go on with the transfer, that he is liable directly to the
injured person.
For a long time it was the well-settled doctrine of the courts that
suit could be brought for violation of a contract only by one of the
parties to such contract. This is still true in some States, notably
in Massachusetts and Connecticut, but in most of our States this doc
trine has been so modified that where a contract between two parties
is made for the express benefit of a third party, such third party
may sue the promisor. The law is in much confusion in this point,
and with the present state of popular discontent with the administra
tion of law and the probable general tendency of the courts, elsewhere
referred to in this paper, it is not impossible that there may be an
even further extension of the rights of third persons not parties to
the contract, but benefited by it, to sue on such contract. An illus
tration of what may happen is seen in the decisions of those courts
permitting a resident of a city which has contracted with a water
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company to furnish water for public use and for the private use of its
citizens to sue such water company for damages resulting through
failure of the company to fulfill its contract. For example, where the
citizen's house is destroyed by fire by reason of the failure of the
water company to supply the agreed amount of pressure. In the case
of the Guardian Trust Company against Fisher, 200 U. S., 57, the
United States Supreme Court sustained a decision of the North Caro
lina Supreme Court enforcing such liability on the ground that the
water company was performing a quasi-public or governmental func
tion and was liable to a citizen injured by reason of its failure to
supply the agreed amount of water pressure, but there have been
several decisions in which such suit was allowed on the pure contract
theory. They are not, in my opinion, sound as a matter of legal
theory, but no one knows when the doctrine may become established
in several of our States. See 3 Mich. Law Review, 442, 500.
Some courts seem to have gone to extreme lengths in requiring the
corporation to ascertain at its peril whether the sale is legitimate
and authorized, and, on the other hand, they have held the corporation
to strict liability for honest but mistaken refusal to make the transfer.
Instances of this type of the twin dangers, the Scylla and Charybdis,
between which the transfer agent must steer its narrow and tortuous
course, may be found in two recent cases. In Miller vs. Doran, 245
1ll., 200, decided in 1910, a corporation transferred the stock in ques
tion after a decree had been entered in pending litigation finding the
ownership of said stock in the prospective transferee. The transfer
was accordingly made. On appeal, however, the decree was reversed
and the corporation was held liable to the person finally adjudged to
be the rightful owner. On the other hand, in Mundt vs. Commercial
National Bank, 99 Pacific Reporter, 454, it was held that the corpora
tion cannot inquire into the motives which induced the transfer, nor
question the consideration of such transfer. In O'Neill vs. The Wol-
cott Mining Co., 98 C. C. A., 309, a corporation was held liable for
refusing to transfer stock, which refusal it based on the ground that
the certificate still stood on its books in the name of the original
purchaser, who, some years before the attempted transfer, had informed
the company that he had lost some of his certificates, and instructed
it not to transfer any of the stock represented without his consent.
The question as to whether a transfer agent is liable for trans
ferring stock upon a forged assignment or certificate remains unsettled
so far as I can ascertain. Of course the corporation itself is liable
for the issuance of certificates forged or fraudulently issued by its
own officers. Jarvis vs. The Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N. Y., 652, and
Fifth Avenue Bank vs. Railway Company, 137 N. Y., 231, are cases of
this type. But it does not follow from this that the transfer agent
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is liable for the same act where the forgery is not by any of its
officers. Neither is there a sufficient analogy between the case of the
transfer agent and that of the bank which cashes a check forged in
the name of one of its depositors, and which is held absolutely liable
therefor, to justify the application of the rule of the banker's lia
bility. The banker is rightly held to a knowledge of his depositor's
signature. The transfer agent, on the other hand, has not the same
means of knowing the shareholder's signature, and in the absence of
actual negligence should perhaps not be held liable. I do not under
take to predict, however, how this question will be finally settled.
The supposed analogy between strictly negotiable paper and corporate
stock has been worked a little too hard. While there may be a tend
ency toward approximation in the legal characteristics of these two
types of paper, the decisions of the courts, nevertheless, make clear
that there are vital differences. For example: The vendor of corporate
stock does not warrant its value. Rereton vs. Maryott, 21 N. Y. Eq.,
123. In the case of Rothmiller vs. Stine, 143 N. Y., 581, it was said
that the rule that one who sells commercial paper payable to bearer
warrants that he has no knowledge of any facts which prove the paper
to be worthless, on account of the insolvency of the maker, does not
apply to the sale of corporate stock so as to place the stockholder
under any legal obligation to state the fact that the corporation is
insolvent.
A few suggestions with reference to the report of the Stock Transfer
Conference may not be amiss. These are not in supposed correction
of, or addition to, that report, for which, as well as for the distin
guished gentlemen who participated in the conference, I have the most
profound respect. On the contrary, they are to be taken only as
growing out of some special experiences of my own, and as made with
reference to the possible future tendencies of our courts, elsewhere
referred to in this paper. It may not be presuming of me to say that
this report contains an admirable statement of those powers so far as
the disposition of corporate stock is concerned. Quite properly the
report justifies the transfer of stock to or by an executor or adminis
trator, when there are no facts which would put the corporation or
its agent upon notice of any limitation of authority by the will or
law, or of paramount rights of others as creditors, heirs or legatees
which might restrict such right of alienation. It is precisely here,
however, that it seems to me we may look for some change in the
attitude of the courts. Our existing decisions go far in giving the
executor the right to deal fully with the assets of his testator and in
permitting third persons, without notice of restriction or limitation,
to acquire good title to such assets, even where the executor has im
properly sold them.
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How great latitude in this respect has been allowed may be seen in
the case of Carter against Manufacturers National Bank, 71 Maine,
448, in which a bank had loaned money on a pledge, by an executor,
of stock belonging to his testator's estate, the proceeds of which loan
he converted to his own use. The bank was allowed, nevertheless, to
retain title to such stock as against creditors and other claimants.
The recent Mississippi case, Meyers vs. Martinez, 48 So. Rep., 291, is
perhaps even more extreme. In that case an executrix fraudulently
appropriated stock, in a bank of which she was a director, to the
prejudice of creditors. The bank had permitted her to sell this stock,
knowing of the pending administration, yet it was held that the bank
had incurred no liability to the creditors.
The doctrine thus exemplified is based upon conditions which no
longer exist. In the first place, it was the early theory of the courts
that the executor, being the confidential appointee of his testator,
stood in the latter's shoes and could deal with his estate pretty much
as the deceased himself might have done. With the developments of
our modern probate law and the close scrutiny and supervision of the
court over all of the executor's acts, this view of the executor's rela
tionship to the estate and his power in connection with it is no longer
tenable. In the second place, the great power allowed the executor
was due to the opinion that he should be permitted to deal freely
with the assets of the estate and that purchasers should be able to
buy freely, in order that the best price might be obtained. The same
developments of the functions and powers of the probate court, includ
ing the power to authorize a sale at any time and to require a bond,
now enable the executor to give assurance of title to the purchaser in
all cases where he has a right to sell. It will not be surprising,
therefore, if the courts in the near future show a tendency to find
that the purchaser from the executor is bound by the mere fact of
the executorship to ascertain at his peril the extent and the limits
of the executor's authority in each case, and the facts as to the pay
ment or non payment of taxes, debts and legacies. In other words,
the present tendency, though not a marked one, is to restrict and
limit the legal presumption that the executor is dealing lawfully.
This possible increase of liability can be partially guarded against by
insisting upon an order of court authorizing the sale, or the taking
of an indemnifying bond in most cases.
There is great danger in dealing with that portion of an estate
which is covered by the residuary clause. Cases are not uncommon in
which the residuum of an estate, supposed at the time to be large, is
given to the widow or other near relative of the deceased. Though
large when the will was made, or even when the testator died, this
residuum may shrink before the time of closing the estate. It may
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well be, and in many cases it has transpired, that property thus dis
tributed or sold under the residuary clause turned out to be needed
to pay debts or specific legacies. No transfer agent, therefore, should
consent to the sale of stock covered by a residuary clause of the will
without an order of court, an indemnifying bond, or other protective
measure, except, perhaps, in the clearest possible case of a sufficiency
of assets. This point may be considered in connection with questions
I and VI of the Conference Report.
In regard to transfers by guardians, it seems to me that when it
is feasible to do so the transfer agent should require copies of the
letters of authority to the guardian, and if the ward's estate be still
under the control of the court it should demand an order of court
authorizing the transaction. I cannot but feel that it is dangerous for
the transfer agent to rely upon the presumption that the guardian is
acting lawfully and with authority. The courts are proverbially tender
in the affairs of wardship, and the utmost care in dealing with guar
dians is advisable.
I have time for only a passing reference to a few matters concerning
the liability of trust companies acting as trustees under mortgages
securing corporate bonds. It is apparent that the practice during the
last few years has tended toward a uniform and, it seems to me, a
very wise refusal of trust companies to certify the character or quality
of the bonds thus secured either as "first mortgage," "leasehold" or of
other types. But it is obvious that trust companies should have no
connection with a bond issue in which the salient characteristics of
the security are not clearly set forth on the face of the bond itself,
together with reference to the mortgage or trust instrument in which
a complete and detailed statement of the security should, of course,
be made. The purchaser should determine the character, quality and
value of the security for himself; at least he should not look to the
trustee for this information. The trust company has too many impor
tant functions to perform, and it owes too much to its stockholders
and the various enterprises with which it is connected to subject itself
to the uncertain and potentially enormous liability involved in certi
fying the character of securities. The liability of the trustee ought to
be clearly and definitely set forth in the trust instrument. So far as
the bond is concerned, the nearly universal practice now seems to be
to make a simple statement like the following:
"This is to certify that this is one of the bonds men
tioned in the indenture within referred to."
As a matter of practice, however, trust companies pretty generally
undertake for their own assurance and reputation many things not
indicated by the foregoing, and there is unquestionably a strong dis
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position on the part of the investing public, at least in that class of
non-professional investors known as "outsiders," to infer that the con
nection of the trust company with an issue of secured paper is a sort
of blanket guarantee that all is well. Unquestionably prominent trust
companies are often selected to perform the function of trustee for
the very purpose of giving this general assurance, facilitating the sale
of the securities. This, in my judgment, makes the situation a dan
gerous one, for while the general popular belief cannot create legal
liabilities, acquiescence in this custom and in this popular impression
will tend to color the decisions of the court when questions of lia
bility arise. It is highly important, therefore, that the liability of
the trustee be strictly defined and limited, and that by proper re
citals in the bonds and trust instruments notice of the limitations
be brought home to investors. In this same connection the most scru
pulous care should be exercised in the choice of words used in describ
ing the securities. An illustration of what I mean is brought out in
the following incident. A corporation recently borrowed a large sum
on its own notes. This issue was carefully protected by an instru
ment with the ordinary commercial safeguards. Acting on the advice
of one of the most skillful examiners of corporate securities, the trust
company requested to act in the premises refused to certify this issue
of notes so long as the promises to pay were styled "debentures," on
the theory that a debenture imported some kind of collateral and that to
certify such notes as debentures might mislead the public. But, after
all, the safeguarding of the trustee in these transactions is a matter
of individual consideration in each case, and few general rules of
value can be laid down.
In the foregoing fragmentary discussion I have considered the lia
bilities of the trust company, especially when acting as transfer agent
and registrar, as circumscribed by the law of agency. I think it
highly desirable for many reasons that the liability be so limited, but
I can scarcely feel that I shall have shown the extent of my appre
ciation of the honor you have conferred upon me in asking me to
address you unless I point out certain tendencies which seem to me
not unlikely to result in an actual extension of and addition to the
liabilities incurred by the transfer agent and, to a less extent, by the
registrar. It might for the moment be more gratifying to you if I
were to assert roundly that these liabilities can never transcend those
of the ordinary agent, and that the only questions which can arise in
the future are those involved in the application of the settled prin
ciples of agency to specific cases arising in the trust company's busi
ness. I cannot but feel, however, that there are many signs of the
times and many currents of popular thought and some almost casual,
not to say subconscious, expressions of the courts themselves in cases
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involving trust companies which portend possible changes in the law.
And unpleasant and unpopular as it may be to bring these matters
to your attention, it seems to me that this is the honest and perhaps
the only service I can render to you on this occasion. It would be
superfluous to do more than merely refer to the present intense popular
dissatisfaction with the attitude and conduct of the profession which
I am proud to represent here to-day—with our existing law, especially
that concerning large business activities, and with the administration
of justice generally. In the nature of things the lawyer is, and ought
to be, conservative. As Sir Frederick Pollock, the great English jurist,
has said, "taught law," by which he means in effect English and
American law of to-day, "is tough law." It has resisted change, and
has seriously retarded in some particulars legal reforms instituted by
legislatures by applying the rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed. As a result we have been
almost overwhelmed with a flood of criticism, some just and more of
it unjust. And certainly, however unjust this criticism may be, I do
not see how anyone can fail to realize that there has grown up among
the American people a state of mind and an attitude, not wholly the
work of demagogues, which is exerting and is sure for some time to
continue to exert an increasingly powerful influence upon our legis
latures and courts.
This wave of popular criticism, so far as it affects the law relating
to trust companies, bears most heavily upon the supposed favoring of
large business enterprises at the expense of the individual circuity of
action, concerning which I have already spoken, and technical or arbi
trary defenses. There is a strong feeling that too often the law con
siders the form rather than substance of things. Moreover, the recent
development of the paternalistic attitude of government in the effort
to have government protect the individual in every possible way, a
tendency which certainly has its unfortunate results whatever may be
its effect as a whole, finds a corresponding tendency to insist that the
individual be protected by somebody, even in his individual investments
and business enterprises. In endeavoring to prove worthy of public
confidence, and I suppose to increase business, trust companies have
perhaps emphasized this tendency by doing a great many things in
connection with their agencies and trusteeships which are not strictly
within the scope of such employment. With the courts yielding, per
haps subconsciously, to this popular demand for the protection of the
individual as against the great corporate enterprises, and for direct
ness of action, as in permitting a suit against the agent, it would not
be surprising if they were to permit the growing custom of trust
companies to undertake these enlarged functions, to result in the
establishment of legal liabilities not before attendant upon the func
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tiona in question. The case of the transfer agent affords the best
illustration of this possible tendency. When the transfer of corporate
stock was purely an internal affair, performed by the officer or employee
of the company, the scope of the liability incurred was necessarily
limited to the precise work of transferring the stock; but now the
custom is well established to employ for this purpose an independent
corporation with established reputation for skill, fidelity and financial
responsibility. While this change may have been brought about mainly
by the demands of the New York and other stock exchanges, there is
no doubt that corporations are influenced to employ trust companies
in this capacity for the purpose of inspiring confidence in the pur
chasers of stock, and the purchaser is thus led to feel that an impar
tial agency, one not controlled by the corporation itself, is passing, in
a general way at least, upon the validity of the stock and its assign
ment. Is it not probable that there will grow out of this custom
something more than mere agency? A corporation may employ a man
with an established reputation for skill and honesty, and do so partly
for the purpose of increasing its business, yet here there results noth
ing but a case of agency. Impalpable though it may be, it seems to
me, nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between such a case and
that of a trust company in such a capacity. Unquestionably the public
deals more freely in stock which is transferred and registered by such
an agency than with one not so certified. A general feeling of security
is induced, and this fact is getting to be well known. Several years
ago a case arose in New York which illustrates my point, and the
decision of the case tends to confirm the existence of such a tendency
as I have indicated. In McClure vs. Central Trust Company, 165
N. Y., 108, one Warner had sold his patent medicine business to an
English corporation, in which he became the largest stockholder. De
siring to put his stock on the market in this country, he employed a
firm of promoters. They issued a prospectus, offering for sale certain
shares of this stock, for which the purchasers were to receive cer
tificates issued by the Central Trust Company as transfer agents.
McClure, the plaintiff in this case, received such certificates from the
Central Trust Company, but Warner being indebted to the English
company, the latter refused to transfer his shares. The court held
the Central Trust Company liable as a vendor upon an implied war
ranty of good title. I recognize that this is not a typical case, but
the opinion of the court indicates appreciation of the fact that the
transfer agent may easily put itself in a position with liabilities
much greater than those of a mere agent. As I have before said,
popular belief cannot create legal liabilities, nor can mere custom
change established law, but in most of our States there is no estab
lished law relating to the status and liabilities of trust companies
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acting in certain capacities. Without saying that they would be jus
tified in so doing or that this would be a scientific development of
law, I believe that it is nevertheless true that some court or courts
of last resort may, in the near future, hold for an enlarged liability
of the kind indicated, perhaps that of an insurer, even upon the rather
vague basis I have outlined. If they do, it will be because they
recognize that the participation of a great trust company aids, and is
often intended to aid, in the sale of corporate stock, and they will
say that out of this grows moral responsibility and legal liability.
Now I am very far from believing that this possible tendency is
desirable. On the contrary, because of the delicate and important
functions it has to perform, because it has become such an essential
part of our vast modern fabric of business, it seen s to me that trust
companies should not be allowed to incur this potentially varied and
enormous liability. How can such liability be escaped should the
courts manifest a tendency to impose it? I can add little, if any
thing, to what has been said by former speakers in arguing for legis
lation, uniformity of practice, avoidance of general terms in certifi
cates and elsewhere, and the strict and explicit limitation of the
functions undertaken and liabilities recognized.
The recent case of Davidge vs. Guardian Trust Company, 203 N. Y.,
331, and the somewhat earlier case of Gause vs. Commonwealth Trust
Company, 196 N. Y., 134, will show what legislation can accomplish.
In this action the court said: "The legislature intended and the public
interests demand that trust companies shall be confined, not only
within the words, but also within the spirit of the statutory provision
which declares that a corporation shall not possess or exercise any
corporate powers not given by law or not necessary to the exercise of
the powers so given. Such authority does not permit a trust company
to enter into speculative and uncertain schemes, or, unless under
peculiar circumstances not disclosed in this case, become the guarantor
of the indebtedness or business of others." This permits the defense
of ultra vires, one of great strategic value.
Something at least can be accomplished in agreeing upon the lan
guage of transfer and registration certificates. For example, it seems
to me better that trust companies should sign "as registrar" or "as
transfer agent." The use of the word "as," though possibly superflu
ous, tends to bring out the limited character of the work performed.
While I do not think that in the case of Jarvis vs. Manhattan Bank
Company, 148 N. Y., 652, the court intended to attach the significance
to the word "countersigned" which some writers have ascribed to it,
still it seems to me it is a word to avoid, because in the popular mind
it is often taken as indicating a general authentication and guarantee
of the instrument in question. For similar reasons perhaps the phrase
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"entered for registration" is to be preferred to the simple word "reg
istered." The difficulty about all of these cases is that the statutes
and the corporations themselves have assumed that certain general
terms, such as transfer agent, registrar and the like, have definite
meanings. This is not the case. Would it not be possible, and is it
not desirable, that these words should all be defined by law, at least
in States in which there is much business of the kind we are con
sidering, or that a precise, explicit delimitation of the functions per
formed be attached to every instrument involved? Just how this
should be done, if it be feasible at all, it would be presuming in me
to undertake to say. Finally, let me repeat that the possible tendencies
to which I have referred would certainly not be scientific legal develop
ments; that the extension of liability, which I fear is on almost every
account undesirable, and that if I have ventured to give expression to
these half prophecies it is because I have a keen appreciation of the
vital importance to the business world, and to all of us, of preserving
the strength and integrity of this great modern commercial device which
you gentlemen so ably represent and which you are conducting with
such marked fidelity and with such fine appreciation of responsibility.
The President: I have no doubt that the members would
like to discuss these very important questions, and unless there
is something to interfere we might request the reader of this
paper to be with us to-morrow morning. I know some of those
present are deeply interested.
Mr. F. H. Goff : Mr. President, appreciating as I do the
great amount of time and labor involved in the preparation of
a paper of this kind, covering practically an unexplored field
of the law, I move you, sir, that a vote of thanks and apprecia
tion be extended to Dean Bates for the able paper just read.
Mr. Poii.lon : I second the motion.
The President: Gentlemen, you have heard the motion.
Those in favor make it known by rising. The motion is unani
mously carried.
I am sure you will be interested in the next speaker, who
has been so long interested in the Trust Company Section, and
in his address, entitled "The Achievements of the Trust Com
pany Section During the Past Fifteen Years." I take great
